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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES
CODE: TIME TO RECOGNIZE THAT
FINANCIAL INFORMATION BECOMES
STALE
I. Introduction
The American Law Institute ("ALI") has completed the Federal
Securities Code ("Code") and it will be introduced to Congress
shortly.' The Code is the product of more than eleven years of
work 2 and has received the endorsement of both the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC")' and the American Bar Association
("ABA"). Interested members of the legal profession have been
active in the drafting process directed by the Code's Reporter,
Professor Louis Loss. Legislative enactment, however, is not
guaranteed.
1. Loss Letter on Changes in Revised SEC Code Proposal, Legal Times of Wash., Sept.
22, 1980, at 21, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Loss Letter]. The Code consolidates an area
referred to generally as securities law. It is currently governed by several statutes which the
Code will supercede if enacted. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1933 Act]; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j,
77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78o-3-78hh (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act]; Public Utility
Holding Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52
(1976). Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976). Amendments
to the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act were effected by the In-
vestment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified at
scattered sections of 80, 15 U.S.C. (1976)). Amendments to the 1933 and 1934 Acts were
effected by the Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codi-
fied at scattered sections of 77, 78, 15 U.S.C. (1976)). Securities Act Amendments of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified at scattered sections of 77, 78, 80, 15 U.S.C. (1976)).
2. Huffman, Negotiators Savor Securities Code Agreement, Legal Times of Wash., Sept.
22, 1980, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Huffman].
3. Id.
4. Id. Although the ABA endorsed the original version of the Code, Loss Letter, supra
note 1, at 21, it has decided not to take any action with regard to the SEC-approved version.
Meeting of the ABA Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Section Committee, Federal
Regulation on Securities (Oct. 18, 1975).
5. Huffman, supra note 2.
6. Professor Loss, has acknowledged that difficulties may arise once the Code is submit-
ted to Congress. Loss Letter, supra note 1, at 23. In addition, commentators have called for
an extensive review of the Code at the congressional level. Benston, Required Periodic Dis-
closure Under the Securities Acts and Under the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1471, 1471-2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Required Disclosure Under the Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code]; Wolfson, Comments on the Proposed Federal Securities
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One area which will be the subject of congressional debate is the
underlying policy of continuous disclosure implemented by the
Code.7 Companies will register once8 and then continuously dis-
close to the securities marketplace important developments which
affect their financial position.9 This Note poses a question which
bears directly upon the disclosure requirement: at what point does
financial information become stale? 10 If disclosure is to be required
on a continuous basis, recognition should be given to the fact that
financial information loses its probative value."
The nature of stale financial information is discussed in Section
II by reviewing the treatment of staleness in common law fraud
and bankruptcy cases. Section III analyzes the approach taken
with regard to stale financial information in existing securities law.
This Note concludes by proposing that an objective definition of
staleness should be incorporated into the Code, thereby placing
reasonable limits on the liability created under the Code's continu-
ous disclosure requirements.12
Code: Transformation of the Securities Act of 1933, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1495, 1517-18
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Comments on the Proposed Federal Securities Code].
7. Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1431, 1451
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Keynote Address]. See also Required Disclosure Under the Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code, supra note 6, at 1472, 1483; Comments on the Proposed
Federal Securities Code, supra note 6 at 1497-9.
8. Required Disclosure Under the Proposed Federal Securities Code, supra note 6, at
1472. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 402, 403 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CODE]; See also notes
201-05 infra and accompanying text.
9. See CODE, supra note 8, § 602; notes 201-05 infra and accompanying text.
10. For the purposes of discussion, "financial information" is intended to include press
releases and interim reports relating to earnings and financial data although reference pri-
marily is made to audited financial statements. "Stale" or "staleness" refers to the point at
which information, because of elapsed time or subsequent events, ceases to provide a relia-
ble basis for decision making.
11. Professor Loss has stated as one of the Code's aims, "[the] reexamination of the
entire scheme of investor protection with a view to increasing its efficiency and doing so, in
President Roosevelt's words, 'with the least possible interference to honest business.' " Loss,
ALI Federal Securities Code: A Program, 34 Bus. LAW. 347 (Nov. 1978 - Feb. 1979).
12. The purpose of this Note is to review and comment upon the treatment of stale
financial information in specific areas of the law. Nevertheless, brief consideration should be
given to the ongoing debate within the financial community between a majority of academi-
cians engaged in empirical research and professional money managers. Shapiro, Letter from
Wall Street - Random Walk, ACROSS THE BOARD, Nov. 1977, at 8 [hereinafter cited as
Random Walk]. See also Frankfurter, Index Funds: Fad or Foe? J. ACCT., AUDITING & FI-
NANCE, 116-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Index Funds]. Essentially the debate is between
those who believe that stock prices follow a random walk and those who argue that although
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II. The Nature of Stale Financial Information
At common law, in an action alleging fraud (misrepresentation
and deceit), the staleness of financial information is often con-
sidered in determining whether reliance was reasonable. Although
some courts have had difficulty formulating a standard for deter-
mining when financial information becomes stale,13 few have chal-
lenged the notion that at some point staleness occurs.14 Further,
many courts have been willing to apply objective criteria, such as
stock market prices will not increase or decrease at a fixed rate, by charting past price
movements (trend analysis), discernible patterns can be used to predict future movements.
Random Walk, supra at 8. Movements are random in the sense that history does not repeat
itself, "[k]nowing the course of a stock's past price movements is of no value in predicting
its future course" Random Walk, supra, at 8. See also FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BOARD, FASB DISCUSSION MEMORANDUM 7 (July 31, 1979) (random walk and trend analysis
theories discussed in relation to corporate earnings rather than stock prices) [hereinafter
cited as FASB MEMO].
The random walk is a well established theory of finance supported by a significant
amount of empirical research. See Chant, On the Predictability of Corporate Earnings Per
Share Behavior, J. FINANCE, 13 (March 1980) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Earnings] and
articles cited therein. Under the random walk theory, an efficient stock market is dominated
by "competing, rational, profit-maximizing buyers and sellers ... quick to obtain new infor-
mation and act on it." Random Walk, supra, at 8. Inherent in the theory, therefore, is the
assumption that financial information becomes stale as more recent developments reach the
marketplace. See FASB MEMO, supra, at 7.
Trend analysis, espoused by professional money managers referred to as chartists (ana-
lysts who seek to predict future stock market prices by charting past price movements),
assumes that financial information will remain a predictive tool. Although current informa-
tion becomes available, prior financial statements are necessary to an accurate assessment of
future earnings. FASB MEMO, supra, at 7. Trend analysis, therefore, is not consistent with
an objective definition of staleness.
Empirical evidence tends to support the random walk theory. In addition, the investment
community (traditionally a random walk opponent) has created "index funds" which rely on
a random walk assumption and allow individuals to invest in the market as opposed to a
particular company. Index Funds, supra, at 116. No definitive choice, however, has been
made within the financial community between the random walk and trend analysis theories.
See generally Corporate Earnings, supra; FASB Memo, supra; Index Funds, supra; E.
Miller, A Simple Counter Example to the Random Walk Theory, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., 55
(July-Aug. 1979).
13. Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 29, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (1887); Newark Live Poultry
Co. v. Fauer, 118 N.J.L. 556, 558, 194 A. 270, 272 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 120 N.J.L. 187, 199
A. 12 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938); Duncan v. Stoneham, 253 N.Y. 183, 186-87, 170 N.E. 571, 572
(1930); Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N.Y. 322, 332 (1855); De Swarte v. First Nat'l Bank, 188 Wis.
455, 457, 206 N.W. 887, 890 (1926).
14. Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. 437, 440, 528 P.2d 188, 191 (1974);
Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorp., 280 Ill. App. 151, 159 (1935); Von Bruck v.
Peyser, 25 N.Y. Super. Ct. 468, 478 (1864).
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prevailing economic conditions and business customs, in evaluating
staleness.' 5
The general notion that information may become stale has been
recognized in several areas of law.' With regard to financial infor-
15. Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. at 440-41, 528 P.2d at 191; Fether-
ston v. National Republic Bancorp., 280 Ill. App. at 159; Newark Live Poultry Co. v. Fauer,
118 N.J.L. at 558, 194 A. at 272; Macullar v. McKinley, 49 N.Y. Super. Ct. 5, 10-11 (1882),
aff'd, 99 N.Y. 353, 2 N.E. 9 (1885).
The common law torts of misrepresentation and deceit are relevant to judicial interpreta-
tions of the Securities Acts. See Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1976)
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976)
(citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)). Cf. McClean v. Alex-
ander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1202 (3rd Cir. 1979) ("[Tlhe standard of liability for common law
fraud under Delaware law is the same as that for liability in an action implied from [§ 10b,
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1977)].").
16. The relevant cases may be categorized as follows: (a) Banking: In Asbury Park &
Ocean Grove Bank v. National City Bank, 35 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942), afJ'd, 268 A.D.
984 (1st Dep't 1944), the defendant bank issued a letter of credit at the plaintiff's request.
In order to protect itself, the defendant required the plaintiff to deposit certain securities as
collateral. Drafts were then submitted by the beneficiary of the credits and despite the
plaintiff's request that the drafts not be honored, the defendant found that the drafts com-
plied with the terms of the credits and paid the money. The defendant asserted ownership
over the collateral and the plaintiff sued the bank for conversion of the securities.
The court in Asbury Park focused on whether the drafts and shipping tickets conformed
with the requirements of the letter of credit. "Plaintiff argues that a point might be reached
where the shipping tickets would be considered to be too old to satisfy the credit aIthough
there was no condition as to the date of shipment." Id. at 989-90. The court held that the
"documents were not stale in this case," id. at 990, because the shipping tickets related to
the transactions which were the subject of the letters of credit. "[T]here is nothing stale
about a shipping ticket representing goods shipped within this period, but eighteen months
before the draft was presented." Id. (emphasis added).
(b) Fair Credit Reporting Act: In McPhee v. Chilton Corp., 468 F. Supp. 494 (D. Conn.
1978), an action was brought charging that the Fair Credit Reporting Act had been violated
when a credit reporting agent indicated that the plaintiff had filed a bankruptcy petition,
but not that the petition was later withdrawn. The court held that "[t]he statute does
prohibit the publication of reports containing stale information about bankruptcies, those
whose adjudication antedates a report by more than fourteen years. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1)
(1976)." Id. at.497. The court noted that all of the provisions of § 1681c concern staleness of
information (fourteen years for a bankruptcy and seven years for suits and judgments, paid
tax liens, accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and loss, criminal records and
any other adverse item of information). However, "[c]ompliance calls for a review of dates
already recorded, rather than a new investigation or verification of matter outside the file."
Id. at 497 n.6.
(c) Fourth Amendment Law: The most extensive discussion of stale information is found
in cases construing the requirement that a search warrant be based on probable cause.
In U.S. v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927 (1979), the
defendants were convicted of importing and distributing marijuana and hashish. On appeal,
the defendants asserted that information relied on in the application for a wiretap was fa-
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mation, however, the discussion has been limited. In common law
fraud, where transactions are primarily at arms length, 7 staleness
is viewed as an objective limitation on the liability imposed for the
issuance of financial information.18 Bankruptcy law, however, in-
volves face to face transactions between a debtor and creditor.' 9 In
this context staleness is determined according to the intent of the
parties.20 Objective criteria, however, such as the length of time be-
tween the issuance of a financial statement and reliance thereon,
are still used to evaluate whether credit was extended within the
period intended."
A. Common Law Fraud
One element of an action for misrepresentation and deceit is jus-
tifiable reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's representa-
tion.2 2 In deciding whether a plaintiff's reliance is justifiable, either
an objective or subjective standard may be used. While a majority
tally stale since the first informant's tip was given 100 days prior to the application and the
second tip was given 30 days prior to the application. The court noted that staleness is an
issue to be decided on the facts of each case. It then held that since the information indi-
cated the presence of an extensive on-going enterprise, "[i]t certainly was not unreasonable
for the judge to conclude that the activity was continuing as of the date of the application."
Id. at 492. See also United States v. Williams, 603 F.2d 1168, 1172 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979) cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1024 (1980) ("We need not address the issue whether a six-month-old tip is
too stale, however, because the magistrate was not limited to that single piece of informa-
tion in his determination of probable cause.").
In United States v. Solario, 577 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1978), the defendant appealed a convic-
tion of receiving and possessing an unregistered firearm, contesting the validity of the war-
rant issued to search his home. The court found that the likelihood the object would be
moved together with the fact that the information provided was at least four months old,
left the information too stale to support a finding of probable cause. In addition, other
"information contained in the affidavit (was] insufficient to cure the staleness of the primary
information." Id. at 556.
17. Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. at 439, 528 P.2d at 190-91.
18. Id. at 440, 528 P.2d at 191.
19. Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U.S. 321, 326 (1924).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971) ("a false representation made by
the defendant. . . [kinowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representa-
tion is false . . [an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action in reli-
ance upon the misrepresentation . . . [j]ustifiable reliance upon the representation on the
part of the plaintiff, in taking or refraining from it [and] damage to the plaintiff, resulting
from such reliance."). See Vanderboom v. Sexton, 460 F.2d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 1972);
Madison Fund, Inc. v. Charter Co., 406 F. Supp. 749, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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of courts apply an objective (reasonable man) standard, 8 others
have held that justifiable reliance is dependent upon a subjective
determination of whether a particular individual had the ability
and right to rely."4 In the context of business transactions, how-
ever, an objective standard has been consistently applied.25 It has
been expressed as a function of time and/or subsequent events.'
1. Subsequent Events
In Aldrich v. Scribner,"7 the defendant's agent made a represen-
tation to the plaintiff (buyer) regarding the number of items to be
sold." The court'held that where the defendant had apprised the
plaintiffs of the actual number of items involved before the sale
was consummated, the plaintiffs were no longer justified in relying
upon the original representation of the defendant's agent.29
23. See note 15 supra.
24. Monte Verde v. Moore, 539 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). Accord, Berg v.
Xerxes-Southdale Office Building Co., 290 N.W.2d 612, 616 (Minn. 1980). In Cheever v.
Schramm, 577 P.2d 951 (Utah 1978), it was held that the buyers had not established that
the sellers had misrepresented the status of the business to be sold. The court stated that
reliance is a question to be determined under the circumstances, taking into account the
age, intelligence, experience, mental condition and knowledge of both parties. Id. at 954.
25. "If [the plaintiff] failed to do those things ... it failed to exercise the care and
prudence that would seem to be required of persons, firms, or corporations engaged in a
business involving such great financial risks." General Fin. Co. v. Nelson, 180 La. 287, 288,
156 So. 355, 356 (1934). Accord, McClean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1086 (D. Del.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) ("At common law as well as
under the securities law, the plaintiff has a duty to act with reasonable prudence in his
business dealings."); National Republic Bank v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 63 Ill. App.
3d 920, 925, 381 N.E.2d 15, 19 (1978). See Johnson v. Lockman, 41 N.C. App. 54, 58, 254
S.E.2d 187, 189 (1979); Harris v. Dunham, 203 Va. 760, 765, 127 S.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Ct. App.
1962).
The objective (reasonable man) standard is not imposed where there have been face to
face transactions and "positive intentional fraud [was] successfully practised upon the single
minded or unwary." Prather v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 218 Kan. 111, 119, 542 P.2d 297,
304 (1975) (quoting Wolf v. Brungardt, 215 Kan. 272, 283, 524 P.2d 726, 735 (1974)). Ac-
cord, Fleetwood Corp. v. Mirich, 404 N.E.2d 38, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
26. Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. at 440-41, 528 P.2d at 191. See note
33 infra.
27. 146 Mich. 609, 109 N.W. 1121 (1906).
28. Id. at 610, 109 N.W. at 1122.
29. Id. at 612, 109 N.W. at 1122. See Des Brisay v. Foss, 264 Mass. 102, 112, 162 N.E. 4,
7 (1928); cf. Levin v. Zeeman, 94 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (City Ct. 1949) ("[P]reliminary state-
ments made by a broker which are superceded by plaintiff's direct dealing with the princi-
pals, cannot constitute a basis for fraud."). But see Nodak Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 533
F.2d 401, 409-10 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant has a duty to see that the misrepresentation was
STALENESS
Subsequent events which will preclude a showing of justified
reliance include a course of dealing between the parties. For in-
stance, in Phillips v. Hebden,0 the parties continued to do busi-
ness with each other for nearly three years after the alleged mis-
representation. The plaintiff (creditor) claimed to have been
deceived by the defendant's false representations as to the owner-
ship of property.8 ' In addition, the defendant had made his
monthly credit payments for nearly one year.3 2 The court held that
the plaintiff's reliance was based upon the credit established by
the defendant through' the prompt payment of his account rather
than upon any representations defendant may have originally
made.83
2. Time
Staleness as a function of time is a ,well recognized principal at
common law.8 4 Most recently, in Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union
Bank,3 5 the court used the length of time which had elapsed be-
tween the issuance of financial information and reliance thereon as
the objective criteria to evaluate the plaintiff's reliance on financial
information."
In Herz & Lewis, a wholesale jeweler brought suit against a bank
and its agent for damages allegedly caused by the bank's misrepre-
fully retracted).
30. 65 A. 266 (R.I. 1906).
31. Id. at 267.
32. Id.
33. Id. In addition, reliance will be precluded as a matter of law where the parties enter
into a subsequent agreement. See Woodmont, Inc. v. Daniels, 274 F.2d 132, 140 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) ("(T]he contractor could not recover damages for
the period following the March 17 amendment ... because they then had no right to rely
on the original misrepresentations."). Accord, Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 154 F.
Supp. 927, 931 (W.D. Wash. 1957) ("[T]he signing of this last agreement of November 1,
1952, operated as a matter of law to deny plaintiff any right to recover by reason of any
alleged misrepresentation made on November 9, 1951.").
34. The fact that financial information will at some point become stale does not appear
to ever have been disputed. The controversy which continues in the common law courts is
whether a time limit can be objectively determined. See Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank,
22 Ariz. App. at 441, 528 P.2d at 191; Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorp., 280 III.
App. at 159; Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. at 29, 11 N.E. at 944; Bradley v. Seaboard Nat'l
Bank, 167 N.Y. at 430, 60 N.E. 771 at 772; Macullar v. McKinley, 49 N.Y. Super. Ct. at 10-
11; Von Bruck v. Peyser, 25 N.Y. Super. Ct. at 478.
35. 22 Ariz. App. 437, 528 P.2d 188.
36. Id. at 440-41, 528 P.2d at 191.
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sentations as to the reliability of a customer who failed to repay
credit the jeweler extended.3 7 The misrepresentation 8 involved
financial information which was given to the plaintiff more than
two years earlier by the bank.8' This information included a false
statement as to the amount of credit the defendant was "presently
extending . . . to [the customer]. ' 40 The defendant averred to the
falsity of the statement but argued in a motion for summary judg-
ment that, because of the lapse of time between issuance and reli-
ance, the plaintiff had no right to rely.41 The lower court granted
the motion. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that
because the case had been dismissed by way of summary judgment
in favor of the defendant (bank), it "would review the facts in a
light most favorable to [the plaintiff (jeweler)]. ' 42 Adhering to the
concept that financial information becomes stale, the court held
that, as a matter of law, the jeweler's reliance was unreasonable
and that given the lapse of time, he had no right to rely on the
alleged misrepresentation."
The finding that the misrepresentation had become stale was
based on several objective criteria." First, the court looked to the
"general capacity for rapid economic change,' 48 and second, to
"the specific transaction involved."' "4 This is consistent with com-
mon law cases which examined the nature of the trade or industry
and any customs regarding the issuance of financial information, as
well as the condition of the economy as a whole, in an attempt to
objectively define staleness.' 7
37. Id. at 437-38, 528 P.2d at 190.
38. The bank did not deny that there was a misrepresentation. It argued that the jeweler
must still prove justifiable reliance or the existence of a confidential relationship. Id. at 438,
528 P.2d at 190.
39. Id. at 439, 528 P.2d at 191.
40. Id.
21. Id. at 437, 528 P.2d at 189.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 441, 528 P.2d at 191.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorp., 280 Ill. App. at 159; Macullar v. McKin-
ley, 49 N.Y. Super. Ct. at 10-11. Some courts have attempted to define staleness subjectively
by looking to the intent of the parties. See Duncan v. Stoneham, 253 N.Y. 183, 187, 170
N.E. 571, 572 (1930) (defendants placed no limitation upon the use of their representation);
Bradley v. Seaboard Nat'l Bank, 167 N.Y. at 430, 60 N.E. at 772 ("The firm cannot be heard
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STALENESS
In Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorporation,' the defen-
dant bank had formed a banking syndicate composed of banks in
outlying districts."' Plaintiffs, depositors in certain of the outlying
banks, brought an action alleging that the defendant bank had
fraudulently induced them into leaving their deposits in the outly-
ing banks by advertising that they were part of a system supported
by enormous combined resources.50 The court held that in light of
the changing conditions in the banking industry, no depositor
would be justified in relying on a statement made a year earlier.5'
The court in Herz & Lewis52 considered the length of delay fol-
lowing the misrepresentation the most important factor in evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's reliance.53 The possibility
that staleness might be expressed as a function of time was first
articulated in the nineteenth century. In Von Bruck v. Peyser, 4 a
seller of goods brought an action alleging that the defendant
falsely and fraudulently induced, him to sell goods to a third party
on credit.5 5 The court held that whether the plaintiffs were influ-
enced in making sales to a third person by representations made
by the defendant two years and four months previously, was a
question of fact.5 The court determined that "the length of time
intervening between the receipt of the defendant's letter . . . and
the sales . . . in the judgment of law [could operate] to prevent
any supposed influence. ' '" 7 While concluding that staleness under
to say that the mischievous force was operative longer than it expected it to be.").
48. 280 Ill. App. 151.
49. Id. at 154.
50. Id. at 154-55.
51. Id. at 159. See Macullar v. McKinley, 49 N.Y. Super. Ct. at 10-11 ("[W]hen the
plaintiffs received the statement of February, they could not be justified in assuming that it
was made by the defendant, as something which he meant they should sell goods upon for
all future time, but only for that space of time that, according to the custom of the agency,
would elapse, before another application be made, and another statement procured."). See
also Newark Live Poultry Co. v. Fauer, 118 N.J.L. at 558, 194 A. at 272 (a suit was brought
for purchases made in June charging the defendant with false representations: the court
noted that the defendant had offered no proof of custom in the trade to support his argu-
ment that the period of time in question negated a showing of justified reliance).
52. Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. 437, 528 P.2d 188.
53. Id. at 441, 528 P.2d at 191.
54. Von Bruck v. Peyser, 25 N.Y. Super. Ct. 468.
55. Id. at 477-78.
56. Id. at 478. Accord, Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N.Y. at 332.
57. Von Bruck v. Peyser, 25 N.Y. Super. Ct. at 478. Cf. Snow v. Hogan, 312 Ill. App. 636,
1981]
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the circumstances should be resolved as a question of fact, the
court postulated that the law would not give representations which
are acted upon a continuing influence for all time," stating that
"[tihere probably must be some limit" to the length of time
financial information can be relied upon.5'
The court in Herz & Lewis criticized the Von Bruck decision
because it failed to distinguish between actual reliance (a question
of fact) and the right to rely (a matter of law).e° Instead it felt that
the concurring opinion was better reasoned. 1 The concurrence in
Von Bruck noted that
the plaintiffs, as persons of ordinary prudence, could not be presumed to
have believed that circumstances of a party would necessarily remain the
same [for two years and four months].6 2
Herz & Lewis, therefore, utilized a common law principle that was
more than one hundred years in the making.68 The liability im-
posed on those who release financial information will be limited to
that period of time for which it remains accurate and reliable." In
order to define staleness, the courts will use objective criteria such
as the nature of the economy and the type of transaction
involved."
640, 38 N.E.2d 934, 937 (1942) ("[The representation] [hiaving been made on June 21, 1929,
it does not prove fraud on October 18th and November 13th, when [reliance is alleged to
have occurred]."); De Swarte v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 N.W. 887, 890 (Wis. 1926) ("One of
the transactions took place in January. We see no reason why the plaintiff could not then
rely on the representations made in October.").
58. Von Bruck v. Peyser, 25 N.Y. Super. Ct. at 478.
59. Id. In Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 11 N.E. 938, allegedly false representations
were made by the defendant to the plaintiff regarding the value of corporate stock. The
court reasoned that it could not rule as a matter of law whether the representations contin-
ued to operate in the plaintiff's mind in April, 1881 even though they had been made in
May, 1880. Id. at 29, 11' N.E. at 944-45. The case was relied upon by the same court in
Joseph v. Tata, 161 N.E.2d 763 (Mass. 1959), where the court refused to rule as a matter of
law that a conversation on or about March 16th had ceased to serve as a ground for reliance
on April 12th or 15th. Id. at 161 N.E.2d at 765.
60. Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. at 441-42, 528 P.2d at 192.
61. Id.
62. Von Bruck v. Peyser, 25 N.Y. Super. Ct. at 482.
63. 22 Ariz. App. at 441-42, 528 P.2d at 191-92.
64. "'[T]he real issue in this case is how far into the future can the information be relied
upon?'" Id. at 440, 528 P.2d at 191.
65. Id.
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B. Bankruptcy Law
The discussion of staleness in bankruptcy law supports the use
of objective criteria to evaluate the conduct of parties involved in
the issuance of financial statements.6 Creditors usually obtain a
signed agreement from their debtors stating that the financial
statement may be relied upon until such time as the debtor noti-
fies the creditor of material changes. 7 As a result, courts in the
context of a bankruptcy proceeding look to the intent of the par-
ties in determining whether the statements should have been relied
upon by the creditor at some point in time after their issuance.6
Detailed analysis of the staleness of financial statements in
bankruptcy law began in the 1920's with litigation that resulted in
the Supreme Court decision of Gerdes v. Lustgarten. Because
these cases involve face to face transactions between a debtor and
creditor, subjective criteria are more important than they are in
common law fraud cases or in the area of securities law, where
transactions often lack an ongoing relationship.
In Gerdes, a debtor submitted a financial statement on January
5, 1920 which stated that the creditor could continue to rely upon
the statement until notified by the debtor of material changes in
his financial condition.7 0 Funds were advanced to the debtor in
October and November of 1920 and in February of 1921. Upon the
debtor's subsequent bankruptcy, the creditor moved to avoid dis-
charge of the debt pursuant to section 14(b) of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1910.1'
The bankruptcy referee allowed the discharge, holding that even
if the creditor had relied on the statement, reliance was not rea-
66. Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U.S. at 326; see notes 80-85 infra and accompanying text.
67. Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U.S. at 326.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 321.
70. Id. at 323.
71. Bankruptcy Act of 1910, § 14(b), ch. 412, 36 Stat. 839 (amending Bankruptcy Act of
1898, § 14(b), ch. 541 30 Stat. 550) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1976)) (repealed 1978)..
Section 32(b) was incorporated into the new Bankruptcy Act. See Bankruptcy Act of 1978,
11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(10), 1141(d)(4) (Supp. III 1979)). The section had provided that the
applicant be discharged unless he has "(2) with intent to conceal his financial condition...
failed to keep books of account or records from which such condition might be ascertained;
or (3) obtained money or property on credit upon a materially false statement in writing,
made by him to any person or his representative for the purpose of obtaining credit from
such person .. " 11 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1976).
1981] 729
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
sonable, "since in view of the financial depression prevailing in
1920, the 'reasonable time' for which the statement remained a
'continuing statement' had expired. 7' The district court reversed
the referee's objective determination and found that reliance was
justified.73 The Second Circuit reversed the district court and af-
firmed the referee's finding that the lapse of time rendered the
statement stale.74
The Supreme Court, acknowledging divisions among the cir-
cuits,75 resolved the question as one of intent. The Court held that
if the written statement was made for the purpose of obtaining
credit and was materially false, "the vice inherent in the original
falsity of the statement is not remedied by the lapse of time. '7 6 It
reasoned that within the time the debtor intended the statement
to be effective he could not argue that extrinsic circumstances
made the creditor's reliance unreasonable. The Court explained
that "the lapse of time is only material in determining whether
credit was extended within the period intended. 7 7 Although the
Supreme Court rejected an objective determination of staleness, it
is important to note that the debtor had expressly recited to the
creditor that the statement be regarded as continuous and binding
and relied upon until changed or recalled. 8
In a case factually similar to Gerdes v. Lustgarten, the Fourth
Circuit utilized the test set forth by the Supreme Court and looked
to the intent of the parties in order to determine how long a
financial statement could be relied upon.79 In International Shoe
Co. v. Kahn,80 three years elapsed between the issuance of the
statement and the extension of credit thereon.8 1 There was an ex-
press provision in the credit agreement that the financial state-
ment would stand good for subsequent purchases signed by the
debtor, but another clause indicated that financial statements
72. Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U.S. at 324.
73. Id. at 324-25.
74. 289 F. 481, 483 (2d Cir. 1923), rev'd, 266 U.S. 321 (1924).
75. 266 U.S. at 325.
76. Id. at 326.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. International Shoe Co. v. Kahn, 22 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1927).
80. 22 F.2d 131.
81. Id. at 133.
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should be issued at least once a year.8 2 Although the Fourth Cir-
cuit applied the Gerdes test, it took into account several objective
factors including the exigencies of business affairs, current business
practises and the request by the creditor (signed by the debtor)
that financial statements be issued each year.s" The court held that
it would be unreasonable to construe the statement as continuing
indefinitely." The statement was viewed as a representation of the
debtor's financial condition only for the year which followed its
issuance.85
The most recent decision to follow Gerdes is Northern Trust Co.
v. Garman." In Northern Trust, the creditor, in making a series of
loans, relied on three financial statements issued separately by the
debtor. 7 The creditor filed a complaint to. prevent the discharge of
a debt pursuant to section 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 19388
alleging that the debtor used materially false financial statements
to secure various loans. Although the most recent loan was ap-
proved based on a seven month old financial statement," the
82. Id.
83. Id. The objective criteria are similar to those used in Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union
Bank, 22 Ariz. App. 437, 528 P.2d 188 (1975). See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
84. International Shoe Co. v. Kahn, 22 F.2d at 133.
85. Id. Cf. In re Simon Weltman & Co., 2 F.2d 759, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Judge Learned
Hand, in an opinion decided while Gerdes v. Lustgarten was pending before the Supreme
Court, wrote that, "[aissuming that [the clause calling for the financial statement's continu-
ing reliability], was not to be read literally yet it meant something .... it was natural
within the year for a seller who had heard nothing from the buyer, nor of any catastrophic
change, as in 1920, [to rely].") (emphasis added).
86. [Current Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. RzP. (CCH) 67,417 (7th Cir. 1980).
87. Id. at 77,710-11.
88. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 17(a)(2) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (Supp. III
1979)). The section provides that an individual debtor is not discharged from any debt-
(2) for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance
(footnote omitted) of credit, by-
(A) false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud, other than a state-
ment respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(B) or use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for obtaining
such money, property, services or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to
deceive.
Id.
89. Northern Trust Co. v. Garman, [Current Transfer Binder] BANKa. L. REP. CCH
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bankruptcy and district court judges found that reliance was un-
reasonable.90 The Seventh Circuit, however, held that the time
lapse between the date of financial statements and the granting of
loans by the creditor in reliance on them was not "so unreasonable
as not to be reliance in fact." 1 Citing Gerdes,a9 the court noted
that the debtor had included a statement agreeing to notify the
creditor of any material changes in its financial position.as Just as
in Gerdes, the Seventh Circuit resolved the question of staleness in
terms of the intent of the parties given the continuing reliability
clause.9
III. Staleness in Securities Law
In order to determine the extent to which staleness has been rec-
ognized in securities law, the civil liability sections of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" will be
discussed with particular emphasis on section 11(a) of the 1933
Act" and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.97 Although securities law
as it presently exists prevents the application of a uniform ap-
proach to staleness,9 s the concept has been viewed as a limitation
on liability under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.9
A. The 1933 Act
The securities statutes were enacted for the purpose of avoiding
67,418 at 77,711 n.2, 77,715.
90. Id. at 77,715.
91. Id.
92. Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U.S. 321 (1924).
93. Northern Trust Co. v. Garman, [Current Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
1 67,417 at 77,715.
94. Id. "[The debtor] clearly filed the financial statements for the purpose of obtaining
credit. .. [and] the creditor extended credit upon the faith of the statements." Whether a
continuing reliability clause exists in an agreement or words by the debtor from which such
assurance can be found, a financial statement speaks as of the date it is issued. Monier v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 82 F.2d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1936).
95. See note 1 supra.
96. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
97. 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1976).
98. See note 1 supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 101-06 (1933 Act) and 121-28 (1934 Act) infra. Similar
to common law fraud, in securities law cases, transactions normally lack an on-going rela-
tionship between the parties. In fact, under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, transactions take place
in an impersonal market. Objective limitations on liability, therefore, are more appropriate
than where the parties are engaged in a continuing relationship.
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frauds by substituting a "philosophy of full disclosure for the phi-
losophy of caveat emptor,"100 and Congress intended that the leg-
islation be construed "flexibly to effectuate [this] remedial pur-
pose." 101 The liability established by section 11, however, is more
than a simple expansion of common law principles to achieve a re-
medial purpose. Section 11 imposes near absolute liability for the
issuance of a false registration statement.10 2 As a result of the
stricter liability, Congress imposed the burden of proving reliance
upon certain plaintiffs bringing an action pursuant to section 11.
The plaintiffs that were singled out in an amendment to section
11(a) are those who purchase securities in reliance on a stale regis-
tration statement.108
Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act was amended during the joint
House-Senate Conference on the 1934 Act.' "  The amendment
placed the burden to show reliance on any plaintiff who purchased
a security subsequent to the issuance of an earnings statement cov-
ering a period of at least twelve months after the effective date of
100. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
101. Id. at 195. See also Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). ("[T]he securities laws
should be interpreted as an expansion of common law ... to effectuate the broad remedial
design of Congress." (footnote omitted)).
102. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRrrEs REGULATION 825 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as JENNINGS & MARSH]; Kripke, Securities Law Reform and the ALl Federal Securi-
ties Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1453, 1462-63 (1979); Keynote Address, supra note 7, at
1446-47.
103. Section 11(a), 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976) reads in pertinent part:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
leading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of
such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity,.
in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue. ...
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available to
its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at least twelve months
beginning after the effective date of the registration statement, then the right of re-
covery under this subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person acquired
the security relying upon such untrue statement in the registration statement or rely-
ing upon the registration statement and not knowing of such omission, but such reli-
ance may be established without proof of the reading of the registration statement by
such person.
Id.
104. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
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the registration statement and made generally available to share-
holders.105 Acknowledging that a financial statement (specifically a
registration statement) may become stale and that staleness can be
objectively defined, the conference committee explained that
"[tihe basis of this provision is that in all likelihood the purchase
and price of the security purchased after publication of such an
earning statement will be predicated on that statement rather
upon the information disclosed upon registration." 0 6
Under both the amended and original versions of section 11 lia-
bility is imposed for material statements in a registration state-
ment which are false or misleading and for material omissions of
facts required to be stated therein.'0 7 "Materiality" must be
proven in order to establish liability under the section.1 0 Reliance,
however, is not generally required.'0 9 Because section 11 is in the
nature of a negligent misrepresentation statute,"0 there is no re-
quirement that the plaintiff plead and prove scienter."' In addi-
tion, section 11 expressly eliminates any requirement of privity of
contract between the plaintiff and the issuer and between the
plaintiff and collateral defendants (such as directors and officers)
so that "[any purchaser in the market. . . may sue. 11 2 Finally,
105. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). Proof of reliance "may be established 'without
proof of the reading of the registration statement'; but since at that point the prospectus
need no longer be delivered to anyone (unless there is an unsold allotment), proof of such
reliance would appear to be very difficult." JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 102, at 833.
106. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
107. 1933 Act, U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 102, at 825;
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
108. Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (mate-
riality defined as "matters which [an average prudent investor should reasonably] know
before he can make an intelligent informed decision whether or not to buy the security").
The Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1975), defined material-
ity in the context of an action brought pursuant to § 14 of the 1934 Act which may be
applicable to § 11 of the 1933 Act as well. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 102, at 826. The
Court in TSC Industries defined materiality as follows: "fa]n omitted fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important."
426 U.S. at 449.
109. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 102, at 833. See also 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(1976).
110. Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1729-30 (2d ed. 1961).
111. Id.
112. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 102, at 832-33. But see Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d
269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967) (plaintiff must still show that he is a purchaser of one of the securi-
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section 11 imposes absolute liability on the issuer.113 The amend-
ment to section 11(a) was intended to limit this liability.
The section 11(a) staleness provision has not been the subject of
extensive judicial construction. 1 4  In Rudnick v. Franchard
Corp.,'" however, consideration of the staleness provision was nec-
essary. In Rudnick the plaintiffs purchased stock which was regis-
tered under two separate offerings. 6 An additional purchase of
stock by one of the plaintiffs occurred after an annual financial
statement covering a twelve-month period subsequent to the sec-
ond offering had been issued." 7 The court held that "[u]nder the
terms of section 11(a), in order for [the plaintiff] to recover on this
claim, it would be necessary for him to prove that he relied upon
the ... registration statement. [Although] [rjeliance may be es-
tablished without proof that he actually read the statement."' s By
imposing proof of reliance, the staleness provision served to limit
the liability of the defendant with regard to the additional
purchase of stock.
B. The 1934 Act
The staleness of financial information is not expressly provided
for under the 1934 Act. Recognition of the concept is implicit,
however, in judicial decisions construing section 10(b) of the 1934
ties issued in the registered offering).
113. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). An issuer may plead as a defense, however, that
the plaintiff knew of the untruth or omission at the time of his acquisition. JENNINGS &
MARSH, supra note 102, at 828-29. Section 11(a) imposes liability subject only to a due dili-
gence defense upon all directors of the issuer, all who sign the registration statement, all
underwriters of the offering and any expert who is named as having prepared or certified
any part of the registration statement. The due diligence defense calls for a "reasonable"
investigation and a "reasonable" belief in the accuracy and completeness of the registration
statement. Id.
114. Section 11 itself has not been the focus of much litigation. See JENNINGS & MARSH,
supra note 102, at 825 ("This was a tribute both to the care with which the Securities and
Exchange Commission processed registration statements and to the ability and integrity of
the corporate bar.").
115. 237 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 872-73.
118. Id. at 873 (footnote omitted). See also Emmi v. First Mfrs. Nat'l Bank, 336 F.
Supp. 629, 634 n.5 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder) FED. SEc. L. R"'. (CCH) 1 93,330 at 91,783
n.5 (D. Me. 1971) (The element of reliance added by amendment to § 11(a) in 1934 is appli-
cable only in the event an intervening financial statement had been issued).
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Act' 9 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.2 0 In order to
restrict the liability imposed by the private right of action created
under section 10(b), the courts have required a showing of causa-
tion in fact between the fraudulent misrepresentation and a plain-
tiff's injury. 21 In List v. Fashion Park, Inc. 22 causation was de-
fined as a function of materiality - an essentially objective
determination and reliance - a subjective element. 23 Courts fol-
119. The 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. A private cause of action was created under § 10(b) "in order to provide a right of
recovery for fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties." Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980) reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id. ("[T]he Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities market-
place that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to ma-
terial information.") Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
at 848.
121. Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975).
122. 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
123. Id. Materiality: Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974)
("The applicable test of materiality is essentially objective . . . 'whether a reasonable man
would attach importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in
the transaction in question.' ") (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d at 462) (citation
omitted).
Reliance: List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d at 462 (Requiring the "misrepresentation [to be]
a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct" of the individual plaintiff.) (quot-
ing Restatement of Torts § 546 (1938)); Accord, Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266,
1271 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975); Marbury Mgmt., Inc., v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509, 514 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). Proof of reliance is not required in cases involving a failure to disclose. Affiliated Ute
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lowing List, however, borrowed the term "justifiable reliance" from
the common law torts of misrepresentation and deceit.2" The ef-
fect has been to create a judicial hybrid which utilizes objective as
well as subjective criteria."25
Just as at common law, staleness is viewed under the 1934 Act as
a limitation on liability for the release of financial information. At
common law, however, courts are concerned with actual reliance
(subjective) and the right to rely (objective." Staleness affects a
plaintiff's right to rely.1 27 Under the 1934 Act, the courts are con-
cerned with reliance (subjective) and materiality (objective)." 5s
While staleness at common law affects only the plaintiff's right to
rely, under the 1934 Act, it has been considered in conjunction
with plaintiff's burden to show both materialty and reliance.
1. Materiality
In Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co.," 9 the defendant was
charged with material misrepresentations and omissions in
financial statements for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968 pub-
lished in an annual report and proxy statement in violation of sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5.180 Plaintiffs were pur-
chasers of stock in the corporation which defendant audited and
sought to represent a class of all purchasers of stock between Sep-
tember 26, 1968 and November 1, 1969.181
On a motion of the plaintiffs for class action certification the de-
fendant argued that materiality was not a common issue to the
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). See also Williams v. Sinclair, 529
F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir. 1975); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir
1975); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975). Where reliance is
required, it cannot be determined solely through subjective analysis. Although the original
formulation spoke in terms of a subjective test of reliance, List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d at
462, "[a] . . .study strongly suggests that [the Second Circuit] has been loath to modify the
reliance requirement to account for characteristics, peculiar to the individual plaintiff."
Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (footnote omitted) (citing 72 COLUM.
L. REv. 562, 567 (1972)).
124. See Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695-97 (10th Cir. 1976).
125. See note 123 supra.
126. Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. at 440, 528 P.2d at 191.
127. Id.
128. See notes 122, 123 supra.
129. 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
130. Id. at 471-72.
131. Id.
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class.112 In anticipation of the court's finding that materiality was a
common issue, the defendant argued that "plaintiffs cannot pre-
sent a homogeneous class because materiality would vary over
time.'' 3 3 Essentially, the argument presented to the court was that
information made available to the public through a number of
sources, would gradually negate the materiality of any alleged mis-
representations or omissions in the June 30, 1968 financial state-
ments. 3 4 As financial information (including interim earnings re-
ports and public announcements relating to corporate affairs)
became publicly available, the audited financial statement would
become stale.18 5 The defendant asserted that because the "alleged
misrepresentations and omissions would depend at what point dur-
ing the class period the purchase of. . . stock was made,"'5 class
action certification should be denied. The court did not question or
find fault with the staleness argument and expressly stated that
the argument might succeed.18 7 Instead of denying certification,
132. Id. at 474-75. On this question, the court found that materiality was "a common
issue to be analyzed on an objective basis." Id. at 475.
133. Id. at 475. See Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
Brief for Defendant, at 46-58. Id.
134. Id. at 475-76. "The public information alluded to. . . consisted of interim earnings
reports issued on November 8, 1968, February 14, May 15, 1969 and the report for the fiscal
•. 7 "year ended June 30, 1969 which was issued October 21, 1969. In addition, there were public
a.nnouncements that: (1) the SEC had required Black Watch to register its herd program as
a security under the Securities Act of 1933; (2) Bermec would be acquiring several new
companies; (3) Congress would be enacting tax reform legislation which might effect Black
Watch's operations; and (4) Black Watch would be sold to State Mutual Life Assurance
Company." Id. at 476 (footnotes omitted).
135. Id. at 476. "[The defendant argued] that . . . assuming [the 1968 financials] were
material at the beginning of the class period, they would subsequently become immaterial as
each bit of information or combination of information became known to the public." Id.
136. Id. But see James v. Gerber Products Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978) ("The
undisclosed information in dispute. . . is comprised of interim earnings figures. . .. [which]
only rise to the level of materiality when they can be calculated with substantial certainty
[that is, when they are finalized a month or so after the end of a business quarter].")
137. 67 F.R.D. at 476. "If at a subsequent point in litigation [the defendant] is able to
demonstrate that the misrepresentations and omissions, in light of other information, were
not material . . . ." But see cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their argument that ac-
tions have been permitted to proceed on behalf of a person who purchased securities over an
extended period of time. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Werfel v. Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Caesars Palace
Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88
(N.D. Cal. 1973); Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); In re Penn
Central Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974);
Rosenblatt v. Omega Equities Corp., 50 F.R.D. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Fogel v. Wolfgang, 47
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however, the court determined that the flexibility of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure' 8 would allow it to "alter or amend any
class certification order to narrow the class to those who purchased
during the period when there was materiality.' ' 39
2. Reliance
In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 40 an action was brought
pursuant to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 for the
issuance of allegedy fraudulent press releases by the defendant.' 4'
The district court found that on April 12, 1964, the defendant had
issued a materially "inaccurate, misleading and deceptive" press
release. " 2 The defendant argued in its appeal, however, that once a
curative press release was issued on April 16, 1964, and received by
the brokerage houses, reliance upon the April 12 press release
would be precluded as a matter of law. 43 In other words, as soon
as the April 16 press release was disseminated publicly, the April
12 release became stale.
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the validity of the argument
determining that "[a]t some point in time after the publication of
a curative statement such as that of April 16, stockholders should
no longer be able to claim reliance on the deceptive release.""'4
The court then proceeded to review the conduct of each plaintiff
finding that by April 22 and April 23, due to the wide publicity
given to the April 16 statement, "the reasonable investor would
have become informed of the April 16 release and could no longer
rely on the earlier release in selling TGS stock."" 0
F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Kronen-
berg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Tucker v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 61 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), Brief for Plaintiff at 17-22.
138. FED. R, Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
139. Id. The fact that financial information may lose materiality in light of other avail-
able information has been discussed in nondisclosure cases where the issue is whether the
failure to disclose involved a material fact. See Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp.
929, 941 (E.D. Mich. 1974), affd, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975) ("[I]n light of all the infor-
mation available to them through published material . . . [the undisclosed fact] neither
would or might have affected the action of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.").
140. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
141. Id. at 92.
142. Id. at 97.
143. Id. at 102.
144. Id. at 103.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
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Reliance has also been considered with regard to the liability of
accountants given their continuing duty to disclose under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. " In Fischer v. Kletz,1 4 7 the
plaintiffs asserted that the defendant accounting firm was liable
for its failure to disclose subsequent to its certification of the
financial statement and the corporation's issuance of interim state-
ments, facts which revealed that the statements were false and
misleading. "1 8 On a motion to dismiss by the defendant, the court
reviewed potential common law liability and liability under the
1934 Act. The Fischer court held as against a motion to dismiss
that accountants who had certified a financial statement may be
liable under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act for failure to disclose
after-acquired information which reveals that the statement was
false when issued.14 9
Subsequent decisions have construed Fischer as imposing a
"continuing duty to disclose ... where the auditor learns facts re-
vealing that a certification believed correct when issued was actu-
ally unwarranted. '"1 50 Unfortunately, the courts have not defined
the limitations of an auditor's liability: at what point in time does
a financial statement become stale so that reliance thereon would
be unreasonable and the duty to correct the prior statement
unnecessary.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA"), recognizing the need for guidelines concerning its con-
tinuing duty to disclose,1 5 issued No. 41 of the Statements on Au-
diting Procedures entitled Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing
At The Date of the Auditor's Report."' It acknowledged that due
to a variety of conditions specific actions to be taken may vary "in
146. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 183. Staleness, in this context, occurs as a result of both a lapse of time and
subsequent events.
149. Id. at 194. The defendant's motion to dismiss for liability arising out of an alleged
failure to disclose facts which revealed that the interim statement issued by the corporation
was false and misleading was also denied. Id. at 197.
150. Gold v. DCL, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
151. The need for guidelines was recognized in direct response to the Fischer decision.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA Internal Memorandum
from D. J. Schneeman to Miss Melcher (Sept. 19, 1980).
152. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS VOLUME 1, AU § 561.01-.10 (1980) (Statements on Auditing Standards).
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light of the circumstances. 8 The standard requires that subse-
quently discovered information be acted upon if the auditor's opin-
ion would have been affected had the information been known to
the auditor when he was preparing it, and if he believes that there
are persons currently relying or likely to rely on the prior state-
ment.1 54 In addition, it advises the auditor to consult with his at-
torney because of the legal implications that may be involved. 5 '
With respect to reliance, the auditing standard expressly notes
that "consideration should be given . . . to the time elapsed since
the financial statements were issued," an objective criterion. 5 6 Im-
plicit in the language of the standard is the view that once a new
audited financial statement is issued, prior statements become
stale and need not be corrected or reissued.15 7
IV. The Proposed Federal Securities Code
The purpose of the Code is not only to consolidate the securities
statutes,' 5s but to require disclosure on a continuous basis.159 Lia-
bility for the release of financial information should be limited to
the period of time for which it remains accurate and reliable.160
In common law fraud cases staleness is a function of objective
criteria - most importantly, the length of time between the re-
lease of financial information and reliance thereon."' Although re-
liance may be held unreasonable as a matter of law because of
elapsed time,' 2 the common law courts have had difficulty defining
the period for which those who release financial information will
continue to be liable.' Some courts, however, have favored a one
153. Id. § 561.02.
154. Id. § 561.05.
155. Id. § 561.02. Because there is no objective standard in the 1934 Act, attorneys
would have difficulty advising clients with regard to subsequently discovered information.
156. Id. § 561.05.
157. Id. § 561.06(a) ("Generally, only the most recently issued audited financial state-
ments would need to be revised, even though the revision resulted from events that had
occurred in prior years."); § 561.06(b) ("[AJppropriate disclosure of the revision can be
made in [the new financial statement] instead of reissuing the earlier statements.")
158. See note 1 supra.
159. See note 7 supra.
160. See notes 201-05 infra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 52-62 supra and accompanying text.
162. Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. at 441, 528 P.2d at 191.
163. See note 34 supra.
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year period." Staleness has also been objectively viewed as a func-
tion of time under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.1" In the one section
where it was foreseeable to do so, Congress defined staleness in
terms of a one year period."' Staleness, both at common law and
in securities law cases, has been used as an objective limitation on
liability for the release of financial information. Much of the value
inherent in such a limitation, 1 7 however, is lost when an express
guideline is not provided. 68
A registration statement is stale under section 11(a) of the 1933
Act when a financial statement covering a twelve month period be-
164. Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorp., 280 Ill. App. at 159 ("But whatever may
have been the facts concerning these items. . . the bank statement was published approxi-
mately a year before the bank was closed and was therefore too remote."); See also Herz &
Lewis, Inc. v. Union Bank, 22 Ariz. App. at 442, 528 P.2d at 192 ("[I]n Brown, the delay in
reliance was only three months.") (distinguishing Brown v. Lobdell, Farwell & Co., 51 Ill.
App. 574 (1894)). Decisions construing staleness in the bankruptcy context also support a
one year period. See generally International Shoe Co. v. Kahn, 22 F.2d at 133
("[N]otwithstanding the express provision that it should stand good for subsequent
purchases," the viability of the financial statement was limited to one year.); In re Simon
Weltman & Co., 2 F.2d 759, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Judge Learned Hand wrote that
"[aissuming [the continuing reliability clause], was not to be read literally, yet it meant
something, and it was natural within the year for a seller . . . [to rely].").
165. See notes 101-06 (1933 Act) and 121-28 (1934 Act) supra and accompanying text.
166. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
167. As the Supreme Court recently noted in United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117
(1979):
Statutes of limitation which are found and approved in all systems of enlightened
jurisprudence, . . . represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail
to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that
the right to be free from stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prose-
cute them. . . . These enactments are statutes of repose; and although affording
plaintiffs what the legistature deems a reasonable time to present their claims, they
protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search
for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or
disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or
otherwise.
Id. (citations omitted).
168. The common law courts continue to have difficulty determining when financial in-
formation becomes stale. See note 34 supra. Under the 1934 Act, the accounting profession
found it necessary to establish guidelines in response to Fischer which imposed liability for
failure to disclose after-acquired information revealing that a prior financial statement was
false when issued. See notes 151-57 supra and accompanying text. The court in Tucker v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), postponed the difficult question of
narrowing the class of plaintiffs to those who purchased during the period of time when
reliance was material. See notes 138-39 supra and accompanying text.
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ginning after the effective date of registration has been issued. 6"
This financial statement is presently included in the form 10-K an-
nual report."" Given the comprehensive nature of the 10-K,171 the
reasoning used to justify the imposition of a staleness provision in
the 1933 Act is all the more appropriate today; "in all likelihood
the purchase and price of such an earning statement will be predi-
cated on that statement rather than upon [previously disclosed
information].
The 1933 Act staleness provision provides a guideline to the se-
curities market 17 8 and to the courts as to what constitutes an un-
reasonable period of time between issuance and reliance. Staleness
does not prevent a plaintiff from bringing an action, rather, it cre-
ates a presumption by placing the burden of proving reliance on
those who purchase stock after the annual report has been re-
leased.17 4 In addition, it allows a plaintiff to prove reliance without
having read the statement. 7 5
Under the Code, a staleness provision would have uniform appli-
cation.'7 6 Civil liability sections currently found in each of the
securities statutes'7 7  are incorporated into part XVII of the
169. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
170. Securities and Exchange Comm'n Release Nos. 33-6231, 33-6232, 33-6233, 33-6234,
33-6235, 33-6236, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (1980)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 231, 240,
241, 249).
171. 45 Fed. Reg. at 63,630-2.
172. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41. See notes 103-06 supra and accompany-
ing text.
173. The term "securities market" is used to refer to potential plaintiffs as well as
defendants.
174. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
175. This provides the plaintiff with an opportunity to argue the "fraud on the market
theory." See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976) (Direct proof of reliance from each purchaser on a stock exchange is not neces-
sary. "The statute [section 10(b) of the 1934 Act] and [Rule 10b-5] are designed to foster an
expectation that securities markets are free from fraud-an expectation on which purchas-
ers should be able to rely."). Id. at 907. Cf. Gold v. DCL Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 n.13
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[Defendant] relies on the lack of market or media reaction to the annual
report's disclosures to demonstrate the lack of materiality of the omitted notice of qualifica-
tion. . . . [Tihe remarkable steadiness of the market price for the defendant's common
stock in the week before and after the annual report's issuance strongly suggests that the
earlier omission may ultimately be found to have been lacking in materiality.").
176. CODE, supra note 8, Introduction xix-xx.
177. See note 1 supra.
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Code.178 By adopting a provision similar to that found in the 1933
Act, staleness would be applicable with regard to the release of all
financial information, not just the registration statement. A stale-
ness provision has the flexibility necessary to provide an objective
guideline and still allow a defendant to show that because of subse-
quent events, staleness occurred prior to the expiration of a twelve
month period. 17  In addition, because the previously disclosed in-
formation is only presumptively stale, a plaintiff is not forced out
of court. He may recover so long as he proves reliance. 1S0
In its present form, the Code does not provide for the staleness
of financial information. Although civil liability sections 1703 and
1704 cite the staleness provision added by Congress to section
11(a) of the 1933 Act as a source for the language used,"' they
only provide the defendant with an affirmative defense and require
him to have taken reasonable steps to correct the misrepresenta-
tion or omission.18
2
Section 1703 of the Code imposes civil liability for sales and
purchases of securities by fraud or misrepresentation.' 8 Subsec-
tion (d) provides that a defendant to an action has a defense if he
proves that the misrepresentation or omission was corrected by a
178. CODE, supra note 8, §§ 1701-09.
179. See notes 27-33 (common law fraud) and 140-45 (1934 Act) supra and accompany-
ing text.
180. One clear example of justifiable reliance on otherwise stale financial information
would be an investor who utilized a trend analysis in order to decide on which corporate
stock to buy. See note 12 supra.
181. CODE, supra note 8, §§ 1703(d), Source, 1704(d), Source. See note 103 supra.
182. See notes 184, 187 infra.
183. CODE, supra note 8, § 1703 provides in pertinent part:
(a) TRANSACTIONS NOT EFFECTED IN THE MARKETS.-If the transac-
tion is not effected in a manner that would make the matching of buyers and sellers
substantially fortuitous, a seller or buyer who violates section 1602(a), 1602(b)(1)(A),
1603(a), or 1613 is liable to his buyer or seller for rescission or damages.
(b) TRANSACTIONS EFFECTED IN THE MARKETS.-If the transaction is
effected in a manner that would make the matching of buyer and seller substantially
fortuitous, a seller or buyer who violates section 1602(a)(1), 1602(b)(1)(A), 1603(a), or
1613 is liable for damages to a person who buys or sells during the period beginning
at the start of the day when the defendant first unlawfully sells or buys, and ending
at the end of the day when all material facts (or facts of special significance in the
case of section 1603(a)) become generally available.
(c) RELATION TO SECTION 1704.-Section 1703 does not apply to the extent
that section 1704 applies.
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filing or press release.'" The defense is not available, however,
against a plaintiff who bought or sold securities before the cor-
rected facts became available or before the plaintiff acted in justifi-
able reliance thereon.18 5 Section 1704 imposes civil liability for
false registration statements, offering statements and reports.1 8'
184. CODE, supra note 8, § 1703(d) provides:
A defendant has a defense to an action under section 1703(b) for violation of sec-
tion 1602(a)(1), 1603(a), or 1613 if he proves that the misrepresentation or omission
was corrected by means of a filing or press release or in any other manner reasonably
designed to bring the correction to the attention of the investing public, except that
this defense is not available against a plaintiff who bought or sold (1) before the facts
as corrected became generally available, or (2) in justifiable reliance on the misrepre-
sentation or omission. Reliance on an omission is proved by proof of reliance on the
particular filing or document and ignorance of the omission; but reliance on either a
misrepresentation or an omission may be proved without proof that the plaintiff read
a particular filing or document.
Id.
185. Id.
186. CoDE, supra note 8, § 1704 provides in pertinent part:
Alternative I: § 1704 Treatment for the "10-K"
[(a) SCOPE OF SECTION.-Section 1704 applies (whether or not the particular
registration statement has terminated or bleen withdrawn) on proof that an effective
registration statement, an effective offering statement as of the date specified in sec-
tion 509(2) or (3), an annual report filed under section 602(a)(1), or any other so filed
and incorporated by reference in any such filing (1) contained a misrepresentation, or
(2) omitted a material fact or material document required.]
Alternative II: § 1705 Treatment for the "10-K"
[(a) SCOPE OF SECTION.-Section 1704 applies ( * * on proof that an effec-
tive registration statement, an effective offering statement as of the date specified in
section 509(2) or (3), or a report filed under section 602(a)(1) and incorporated by
reference in any such filing (1) contained a misrepresentation, or (2) omitted a mate-
rial fact or material document required.]
(b) DEFENDANTS.-The following persons are liable for damages under section
1704:
(1) the registrant;
(2) the principal executive officer or officers, the principal financial officer, and
the principal accounting officer of the registrant, in each case as of the effective date
of the registration statement, the date specified in section 509(2) or (3) with respect
to the offering statement, or the filing date of the report, as the case may be;
(3) every director of the registrant as of those respective dates;
(4) every person named with his consent in the registration statement, offering
statement, or report, as of these respective dates, as about to become a director;
(5) every expert whose consent has been filed under section 2003(e), but only with
respect to statements that purport to have been made by him; and
(6) every underwriter in the case of an offering statement.
(c) PLAINTIFFS.-Section 1704 gives a right of action to a person who proves-
(1) that, in the case of an offering statement, he bought a security of a class cov-
ered by the offering statement after its effectiveness; or
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The defense of correction is provided in subsection (d) which in-
corporates language identical to that found in section 1703(d). e7
The Code refers to the 1933 Act staleness provision as a source
for sections 1703(d) and 1704(d).1 88 These sections, however, do
not follow the approach chosen by Congress"e ' in section 11(a) of
the 1933 Act."e0 Congress could have amended the 1933 Act' and
placed the staleness provision in section 11(b) of the 1933 Act"'
where affirmative defenses to liability for a false registration state-
ment are set forth."93 In addition, it could have left the question of
what constitutes a stale registration statement up to the courts.",
Instead, Congress attached the staleness provision to section 11(a)
which sets forth the liability for a false registration statement'"
and defined staleness in terms of a twelve month period for which
(2) that, in the case of a registration statement or report, he bought or sold a
security of the registrant after the effectiveness of the registration statement or the
filing of the report.
Id. For an explanation as to the alternative § 1704(a) formulations see notes 206-10 infra
and accompanying text.
187. CODE, supra note 8, § 1704(d) provides:
DEFENSE OF CORRECTION.-A defendant has a defense if he proves that the
misrepresentation or omission was corrected by means of a filing or press release or in
any other manner reasonably designed to bring the correction to the attention of the
investing public; but this defense is subject to the exceptions in section 1703(d).
Id.
188. CODE, supra note 8, §§ 1703(d), 1704(d) Source.
189. Congress added the 1933 Act staleness provision to § 11(a) by amendment in 1934.
See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text.
190. The Code does make one important improvement, however, in that it refers to the
1933 Act staleness provision and provides for the defense of correction in § 1703(d). See
CODE, supra note 8, § 1703(d) Source. Section 1703 replaces § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. See
CODE, supra note 8, § 1703(a) Comment. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act imposes civil liability
for untrue statements of a material fact (or an omission of a material fact) in a prospectus
or oral communication used to offer or sell a security. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). No
reference was made in § 12(2) to the staleness of financial information. Staleness was only
incorporated into § 11(a). Under the Code, the notion that an original statement might
become stale, is applied not only to registration statements, but to § 12(2) situations as well.
191. See note 104 supra.
192. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1976).
193. "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person, other than the issuer,
shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the burden of proof. . . ." Id.
194. Congress chose to define a stale registration statement as one issued prior to an
earning statement covering a twelve month period beginning after the effective date of the
registration statement. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
195. Id.
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a financial statement was issued.'"
To the extent that the Code modifies the 1933 Act staleness pro-
vision and applies it only to those situations where the defendant
affirmatively corrects a prior statement,19 it fails to address the
problem. In the context of financial information, staleness is an ob-
jectively determined limitation on liability which occurs as a func-
tion of time and/or subsequent events. 1'" It may occur as the result
of an affirmative correction, but it need not be so restricted.'" The
distinction is especially important given the Code's implementa-
tion of continuous disclosure.200
Under sections 402 and 403,01 issuers will register once and con-
tinuously disclose to the market pursuant to section 602202 and
procedures promulgated by the SEC. 03 The purpose of disclosure
is "to keep reasonably current the information and documents con-
tained in the registration statement or to keep investors reasonably
informed with respect to the registrant. 2 04 The Code's emphasis
on current information should be combined with a recognition that
information loses its reliability over time. As was observed more
than a century ago, "[tjhere probably must be some limit. 2 0 5
The 1933 Act staleness provision imposes liability for false regis-
tration statements on "directors and everybody in sight unless
they have affirmatively shown (at least in some cases) that they
made a reasonable investigation. '"20 Under the Code this stricter
form of liability may be extended to the form 10-K annual re-
port. 207 The ALI membership was unable to agree as to whether
196. See note 103 supra.
197. See notes 184, 187 supra.
198. Time: Tucker v. Arthur Andersen, 67 F.R.D. at 476; Herz & Lewis, Inc. v. Union
Bank, 22 Ariz. App. at 441, 528 P.2d at 191. Subsequent Events: Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d at 103; see notes 27-33 supra and accompanying text.
199. An affirmative correction is but one type of subsequent event which renders the
prior statement stale.
200. See notes 7-9 supra and notes 201-05 infra and accompanying text.
201. CODE, supra note 8, §§ 402, 403. See also Required Disclosure Under the Proposed
Federal Securities Code, supra note 6, at 1472.
202. CODE, supra note 8, § 602 (1980). See also Required Disclosure Under the Proposed
Federal Securities Code, supra note 6, at 1472.
203. Id.
204. CODE, supra note 8, § 602(a) (1980).
205. Von Bruck v. Peyser, 25 N.Y. Super. Ct. at 478.
206. Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 1446.
207. Id. at 1446-47.
19811 747
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
the section 11-type liability or that imposed under Rule 10b-510 8
where the plaintiff must establish scienter,' 09 should apply to the
annual report. As a result, "it will be a wide open question that is
presented to Congress.' 10 Before Congress enacts the Code, it
should carefully examine the difference between the staleness pro-
vision it placed in section 11(a) of the 1933 Act and the ALI for-
mulation which speaks solely in terms of a reasonable correction. 11
This is an especially important consideration given the question of
whether the stricter section 11-type liability will be extended to
the annual report on form 10-K. 12'
The Code stresses uniformity as its raison d'etre.'" If a staleness
provision is incorporated into the civil liability sections " it should
provide a guideline by which the courts2'1  will be able to apply the
concept of staleness in the context of a misrepresentation action.",
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1447.
210. Id.
211. The 1933 Act staleness provision applies in a context which includes, but is not
limited to, a defendant's correction of a prior statement. In addition, the Code discusses the
use of an objective standard to evaluate the plaintiff's reliance. CODE, supra note 8,
§§ 1703(d), 1704(d). The Code's Commentary asserts that, "[t]here is nothing magic about
the one year period [placed in section 11(a) of the 1933 Act]. Rather, [the Code provisions
provide an incentive for prompt correction. At the same time, the plaintiff who can prove
justifiable reliance on the uncorrected misrepresentation is not out of court." CODE, supra
note 8, § 1703(d) Comment (2).
While it is true that a correction or any subsequent event (including a lapse of time), may
cause the original statement to be stale prior to the issuance of a financial statement cover-
ing a twelve month period. It is advantageous, however, to provide the courts and the in-
vestment community with objective standards. See notes 34-65 supra (common law), notes
66-94 supra (bankruptcy law) and notes 129-157 supra (securities law) and accompanying
text.
212. See notes 206-10 supra and accompanying text.
213. CODE, supra note 8, Introduction xix-xx.
214. See notes 188-212 supra and accompanying text.
215. CODE, supra note 8, § 202(92). See note 216 infra.
216. Id. § 202(96). Part XVI of the Code, CODE, supra note 8, §§ 1601:1614, consolidates
all the existing provisions that concern fraud, misrepresentation or manipulation. Id. Part
XVI Comment. Specifically, § 1602(a) is the "basic, omnibus, residual provision on fraud
and misrepresentation" from which the other sections of part XVI are particularizations. Id.
Section 1602(a) provides:
(a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to
make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security, an
offer to buy or sell a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security, (2) a
proxy solicitation or other circularization of security holders 'with respect to a security
of a registrant, (3) a tender offer or a recommendation to security holders in favor of
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Because reliance has been eschewed throughout the Code,217 the
only available means of incorporating staleness is through the defi-
nition of materiality.'1 8 A guideline as to what constitutes stale
financial information could be incorporated into the commentary
without interfering with the language of the section. 219
Staleness is an especially important concept within an action al-
or opposition to a tender offer, or (4) any activity or proposed activity by an invest-
ment adviser with respect to a client or a prospective client.
Id. § 1602(a).
Definitions for fraud and misrepresentation are found in §§ 202(61) and 202(96). Misrepre-
sentation is defined solely in terms of materiality, an objective standard set out in § 202(92).
Section 202(61) provides in pertinent part:
(61) FRAUDULENT ACT.-
(A) GENERAL.-"Fraudulent act" includes an act, device, scheme, practice, or
course of conduct that (i) is fraudulent, or (ii) operates or would operate as a fraud.
(B) INACTION OR SILENCE.-Inaction or silence when there is a duty to act or
speak may be a fraudulent act.
(C) KNOWLEDGE OR RECKLESSNESS.-Notwithstanding section 202(61)(A),
a person engages in a fraudulent act only if he acts with knowledge that his conduct
is of a type specified in that section, or in reckless disregard of whether his conduct is
of that type.
Id. § 202(61).
Section 202(96) reads in pertinent part:
(96) MISREPRESENTATION.-
(A) GENERAL.-"Misrepresentation" means (i) an untrue statement of a material
fact, of (ii) an omission to state a material fact necessary to prevent the statements
made from being misleading in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made.
Id. § 202(96).
Section 202(92) reads in pertinent part:
(92) MATERIAL.-
(A) GENERAL.-A fact is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable person would consider it important under the circumstances' in determin-
ing his course of action.
Id. § 202(92).
217. Loss, supra note 11, at 389. ("The common law requirement which is incorporated
in some current securities law provisions . . . is abandoned throughout the Code.").
Justified reliance is required, however, under the sections 1703(d) and 1704(d) where the
defendant has made a reasonable correction. See notes 184, 187 supra. Under the 1934 Act,
the staleness of financial information has been considered with regard to materiality and
reliance. See notes 129-39 (materiality) and notes 140-57 (justifiable reliance) supra and
accompanying text. Materiality is the objective element of causation under the 1934 Act
while justifiable reliance is a judicial hybrid which combines objective and subjective crite-
ria. See notes 121-25 supra and accompanying text.
218. See note 216 supra.
219. The language of the Code's definition of materiality has been expressly approved by
the Supreme Court. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
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leging fraud and misrepresentation because of the Code's duty to
correct. Sub-section 1602(b)22 a creates an express duty where a ma-
terial fact becomes a misrepresentation by reason of a subsequent
event which occurs before the consumation of a sale or purchase.221
Although the only proscription among the current securities stat-
utes is found in a proxy rule, the Code notes that the case law
points to a general duty to correct.2 22 One of the cases cited is
Fischer v. Kletz2 a which concerned an accountant's failure to dis-
close information subsequently acquired thus making certified
financial statements false.22 Just as the accounting profession
found it necessary to establish an objective guideline in response to
the Fischer decision,22 ' the Code should provide some indication as
to the extent of the duty to correct. Incorporating staleness into
the Code's definition of materiality22 would serve to limit the lia-
bility created by the new duty to correct. 227
V. Conclusion
The Federal Securities Code represents an unprecedented op-
portunity for reform in the area of securities law. Although the
Code's authors have observed that "in an age of incredible legal
proliferation . . .[a] sense of perspective and sense of balance...
are sorely missing and overlooked, 2 28 no attempt has been made
to reexamine the disclosure philosophy reflected in existing securi-
220. CODE, supra note 8, § 1602(b) provides in part:
Duty to Correct.-(1) It is unlawful for any person to fail to correct (by means of a
filing or press release or in any other manner reasonably designed to bring the correc-
tion to the attention of the investing public) a statement of a material fact that was
made by him or on his behalf and by his authority in a communication (other than a
filing) with respect to a matter within section 1602(a), and that becomes a misrepre-
sentation by reason of a subsequent event ocurring before-
(A) the consummation of the sale or purchase, or the termination of the acts
constituting the offer or inducement, referred to in section 1602(a)(1).
Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. § 1602(b) Comment.
223. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
224. See notes 146-50 supra and accompanying text.
225. See notes 151-57 supra and accompanying text.
226. See note 216 supra.
227. Section 1703(a) establishes liability for the violation of section 1602(b). See note
183 supra.
228. Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 1451 (Professor Loss paraphrasing Professor
Wechsler of Columbia, Director of the ALI).
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ties statutes.2 29 While continuous disclosure may be a desirable
policyj it is also necessary to consider "the need to avoid the ad-
verse consequences of setting too low a threshold for civil liabil-
ity.''230 Since financial information should not be relied upon in-
definitely, an objective definition of staleness would be valuable.
Expressed as a function of time, such a standard would provide a
guideline for the courts and the financial community. The creation
of a presumption that stale financial information is unreliable,
would strike the necessary balance between responsible disclosure
and reasonable liability.
Scott V. Simpson
229. Id. ("[W]e have not even reexamined the disclosure philosophy [because] Congress
is not going to change [it].").
230. TSC Indus., Inc., v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10 (1976).
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